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Abstract
We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple
finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting
individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these mutations
occur sufficiently infrequently, the dynamics over all population states simplify to an
ergodic Markov chain over just the pure population states (where each population is
monomorphic). This makes calculation of the stationary distribution computationally
feasible. The transition probabilities of this embedded Markov chain involve fixation
probabilities of mutants in single populations. The asymmetry of the underlying game
leads to fixation probabilities that are derived from frequency-independent selection, in
contrast to the analogous single-population symmetric-game case [1]. This frequency
independence is useful in that it allows us to employ results from the population ge-
netics literature to calculate the stationary distribution of the evolutionary process,
giving sharper, and sometimes even analytic, results. We demonstrate the utility of
this approach by applying it to a battle-of-the-sexes game, a Crawford-Sobel signalling
game, and the beer-quiche game of Cho and Kreps [2].
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1 Introduction
In evolutionary game theory, games are played within populations, and the prevalence of
different strategies changes over time according to natural-selection-like dynamics [3–8].
This provides a natural method by which to model biological evolution [3] and various
learning processes [9], and offers a ‘rationality-light’ approach to equilibrium selection [6].
In the classical approach, populations are infinitely large and dynamics are determin-
istic; the focus is typically on the equilibrium refinement of evolutionary stability [3, 5].
More recently, stochastic finite-population dynamics have been introduced into evolution-
ary game theory [1, 7, 10–13]. These often take the form of an ergodic Markov chain—for
example, when there is a positive mutation rate—the state space of which is all possi-
ble strategy compositions of the population [1]. Ranking the various population states’
weights in the stationary distribution is then a natural method of equilibrium selection
[10, 11], and solves many problems of the deterministic approach.
A drawback is that the state space is often very large, making calculation of the
stationary distribution infeasible. Addressing this, Fudenberg and Imhof [1] study the case
of a symmetric game played within a single, finite population, and show that, when the
mutation rate is very small, the evolutionary process simplifies significantly. The intuition
is straightforward: Starting from a pure (monomorphic) population state, we wait a very
long time for a new strategy to appear in the population, because the mutation rate is
small. When it does, it either goes extinct or takes over the population (‘fixes’). Because
this resolution of the mutant’s fate occurs on a much shorter timescale than the waiting
time for another mutation to occur, it typically re-establishes a pure state. The process
therefore approximates a simpler process over just the pure states. This dramatic reduction
of the state space makes calculation of the stationary distribution computationally simple.
The transition probabilities of this simpler process depend critically on the various
mutants’ fixation probabilities—the probability that a given strategy, having arisen in a
population otherwise pure for a different strategy, subsequently fixes in that population.
Because the game is symmetric, the payoffs that determine these fixation probabilities
are frequency dependent—the payoff to a mutant strategy changes as its frequency in
the population increases. For most evolutionary processes, frequency-dependent fixation
probabilities either do not exist in closed form, or are intractable when they do [7]. This
significantly limits the analytical use of Fudenberg and Imhof’s result.
Here, we employ the basic machinery of Fudenberg and Imhof [1] to derive a result
similar to theirs for asymmetric games. There are several reasons why such a result
is desirable. First, many situations in which we might want to study evolutionary or
learning dynamics are best modelled as asymmetric games—for example, signalling games
[14–16], games of entry and entry-deterrence [17–19], and games of time consistency and
commitment [20]. Second, because only strict Nash equilibria of asymmetric games are
evolutionarily stable [21], the deterministic approach based on evolutionary stability often
fails. This is especially true for multi-stage asymmetric games, which typically have no
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strict Nash equilibria (because alternative strategies that induce the same path of play,
prescribing the same actions on that path but different actions off it, are payoff equivalent).
In our model, evolution occurs in multiple interacting populations, one for each role in
the underlying asymmetric game. When the mutation rate is very small, the evolutionary
process simplifies to one over just the pure states (each population is monomorphic).
Transition probabilities between pure states in this embedded process again depend on
the fixation probabilities of single mutants, but these turn out to be much simpler than
in the symmetric game case of Fudenberg and Imhof. To see this, suppose we start in a
pure state. A mutant eventually arises in one of the populations, and either goes extinct
or fixes in that population before another mutant arises in any of the populations. The
other populations are therefore monomorphic for the duration of the mutant’s extinction
or fixation. But because the game is asymmetric, payoffs to different strategies in one
population depend only on the states of the other populations, and so the payoffs that
determine the fixation probability of the mutant (and therefore the transition probabilities
in the embedded evolutionary process) are frequency independent. Frequency-independent
selection is a standard assumption in the population genetics literature [22, 23], and closed-
form fixation probabilities (exact and approximate) exist for many evolutionary processes
of interest. Using our result, we can employ these to derive sharper, and sometimes
even analytical, characterizations of long run evolutionary behaviour in many asymmetric
games of interest. This allows for powerful evolutionary equilibrium selection in these
games.
We illustrate the utility of our result with three examples. First, in a ‘battle of the
sexes’ game, we show that a closed-form characterization of the stationary distribution is
possible. Second, we consider a discrete Crawford-Sobel signalling game [15]. We show
that, when multiple signalling equilibria of differing information content exist for a given
misalignment of signaller and receiver interests, the most informative is evolutionarily dom-
inant. This gives a more foundational support to Crawford and Sobel’s heuristic argument
in favour of the most informative signalling equilibria, which they base on Schelling’s [24]
concept of ‘focal points’. Finally, we apply our methodology to the ‘beer-quiche’ game of
Cho and Kreps [2], and show that, while it supports the Intuitive Criterion in its selection
between the two Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game, non-equilibrium states are also
evolutionarily significant, especially for small population sizes.
2 Evolution with mutations in multiple finite populations
Asymmetric games are characterized by the existence of multiple ‘roles’ (‘Player 1’, ‘Player
2’, etc.). In the evolutionary approach, the simplest way to incorporate multiple roles is
to model evolution as occurring in multiple interacting populations [3, 5, 12, 25–29].1
Suppose that we have an underlying game Γ with roles i = 1, . . . , I, each role associated
1In Section 5, we discuss how our results relate to the alternative modelling choice of a single population,
in which each generation, each member draws a role from some distribution.
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with a finite strategy set Si, and the payoff to a player in role i when play is 〈s1, . . . , sI〉 ∈∏I
i=1 Si given by pii(s1, . . . , sI) ∈ R.
We assume the existence of I populations, one for each role, with the size of each
population i constant through time at Ni ∈ N. The overall population state at a given
time is defined as the I-tuple of strategy frequencies in the respective populations at that
time: pt ∈∏Ii=1 ∆|Si|, where ∆n is the unit simplex in Rn.2 We shall be interested in the
evolution of this population state over time.
Evolution proceeds as a stochastic process in discrete time. Each generation, each
member of each population receives the expected value of interacting, according to Γ,
with a group comprising one member from each other population, randomly chosen, and
with each group equally likely. (The use of expected payoffs, rather than true payoffs
received from single random interactions, is for the sake of tractability.) If ptj(s
k
j ) denotes
the proportion of members of population j that are playing strategy skj ∈ Sj at time t,
then, for example, the expected payoff to a member of population 1 who employs strategy
s11 ∈ S1 in period t is
Epi1(s11|pt) = Epi1(s11|pt−1) =
|S2|∑
k2=1
. . .
|SI |∑
kI=1
pt2(s
k2
2 ) . . . p
t
I(s
kI
I )pi1(s
1
1, s
k2
2 , . . . , s
kI
I ).
Here, pt−1 denotes the population states in all populations other than population 1, and
signifies that the expected payoff to a strategy in population 1 depends only on the strategy
frequencies in the other populations 2, . . . , I, a consequence of the asymmetry of the
underlying game.
These expected payoffs in each population i are then translated to non-negative fit-
nesses fi(s
k
i |p−i) according to some positive monotonic transformation (possibly different
for each population).3 In the case of no mutations, the fitnesses within each population can
be used to update that population to its next-period state according to an evolutionary or
imitation dynamic, usually following the general Darwinian, or ‘monotonicity’, principle
that strategies with high fitness increase in proportion relative to those with low fitness.
Some notation: let Pi denote the (finite) set of all possible population states for pop-
ulation i, let P = ∏Ii=1 Pi denote the set of all possible overall population states, and let
P−i denote the set of all possible population states for populations other than i. The set of
‘pure’ states for population i, Ppurei , comprises all states in Pi where every member of pop-
ulation i is playing the same strategy (in which case we say that population i is ‘monomor-
phic’). Abusing notation a little, we label such states by the strategy that all members
are playing, i.e., Ppurei = Si. Finally, the set of overall pure states, Ppure =
∏I
i=1 Ppurei , is
the set of overall population states in which every population is pure.
The evolutionary process with no mutations in each population i is a stochastic process
2Since the populations are finite, pt is in fact confined to a finite subset of this space.
3Popular choices in the evolutionary game theory literature include linear fitness, fi(Epii) = 1 + ηiEpii,
and exponential fitness, fi(Epii) = exp(ηiEpii); in each case, the parameter ηi > 0 mediates the strength of
selection, i.e., the sensitivity of fitness to changes in expected payoff.
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{X0i (t), t = 0, 1, . . .}, with state space Pi, and transition probabilities T 0i (pi, p′i|p−i) for
p = 〈pi, p−i〉 ∈ P, p′i ∈ Pi. The transition probabilities depend on the population state p−i
because this determines fitnesses within population i.
For each population i, we require two basic assumptions of this no-mutation evolution-
ary process defined by T 0i (pi, p
′
i|p−i):
Assumption 1. If in some period a strategy in population i is absent, then it is absent in
all future periods. Formally, for all 〈pi, p−i〉 ∈ P, p′i ∈ Pi, and si ∈ Si, if pi(si) = 0 and
T (pi, p
′
i|p−i) > 0, then p′i(si) = 0.
Assumption 2. No matter the population state of other populations, any strategy currently
played in i, unless it is played by all members of i, has positive probability of having in-
creased representation next period. For any 〈pi, p−i〉 ∈ P, and for each si ∈ Si such that
0 < pi(si) < 1, there exists p
′
i ∈ Pi such that p′i(si) > pi(si) and T 0i (pi, p′i|p−i) > 0.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied by many finite-population stochastic processes stud-
ied in evolutionary game theory and population genetics when there are no mutations,
selection is finitely strong, and fitnesses are positive. These include stochastic models
of imitation learning [9], the Moran process [30], and the Wright-Fisher process [31, 32].
Processes that are excluded include best-response dynamics and fictitious play [9].
Loosely, Assumption 1 ensures that the pure states for population i are absorbing.
In a learning context, it distinguishes imitation learning from other learning processes:
strategies not employed by anyone in a population cannot be imitated [1, 33, 34]. It is
also a natural assumption in a biological context: without mutations, the creation of novel
genes, and therefore novel strategies, is not possible.
Assumption 2 ensures that non-pure states in population i are transient. This we
take to be the essence of stochastic dynamics. It is important to note that the ‘positive
probability’ of Assumption 2 can be very small. It is not restrictive, for example, that
unsuccessful strategies can spread in a population, since the probability that they do so
can be appropriately small.
One context in which assumption 2 might appear, at first glance, to be too strong is
that of imitation learning in multi-stage games, where some decision nodes are not reached
given the strategies currently employed in the populations, so that ‘play’ at these nodes
cannot be directly observed.4 This is a problem for assumption 2 only if a particular
condition holds, which we consider to constitute a somewhat ‘knife-edge’ case: learning is
by imitation based only on direct observation of play.
If imitation can also be based, even if only to a very small degree, on communication
between agents in a population, then actions at currently-unobserved nodes could be
discussed and imitated, and so assumption 2 would be valid. This we take to be far more
4We are grateful to a referee for emphasizing this point, and prompting the present discussion.
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realistic. It is implicit in Young’s [12] assumption that ‘each time an agent plays he starts
afresh and must ask around to find out what is going on’, and a similar logic underlies
many models of social learning (e.g., [35]). Again, we should stress that any amount of
such communication validates assumption 2; the condition under which it is invalid is
therefore a knife-edge case.5 Communication is especially relevant for situations where
membership of the populations is not fixed through time, instead being affected by exits
and entries (as modelled by birth-death processes, for example). In this case, if a decision
node is currently unreached for a given population, then new entrants in that population
must nonetheless have strategies that prescribe actions at the unreached nodes; in a pure
imitation dynamics, they can only get these by ‘asking around’.
We make the further assumption that the evolutionary processes occur independently
within each population, in the sense that, although the probability that population i
transitions from pi to p
′
i between periods t and t + 1 depends on the period-t population
states of the other populations, the transitions that these other populations make between
periods t and t + 1 do not influence the transition in population i. This is similar to the
assumption that expected, rather than realized, payoffs are relevant for fitnesses, in the
sense that it too is an abstraction from the true, random, matching of players in a given
period. Like the expected payoffs assumption, it is made for tractability.
Under this assumption, the no-mutation processes {T 0i }Ii=1 aggregate to an overall
no-mutation Markov process T 0 over the state space P, where for p = 〈p1, . . . , pI〉, p′ =
〈p′1, . . . , p′I〉 ∈ P, T 0(p, p′) =
∏I
i=1 T
0
i (pi, p
′
i|p−i).
We now incorporate mutations into this general evolutionary process. We specify
for each population i a mutation rate εµi > 0, with µi a population-specific parameter
that governs the between-population relative frequency of mutations, and ε an across-
population parameter governing the overall frequency of mutations. We then alter the
above no-mutation evolutionary process as follows: From a population state pt in period
t, a preliminary (pre-mutation) population state pt+1(0) for period t+ 1 is chosen according
to the transition probabilities T 0, i.e., according to the no-mutation evolutionary process.
This preliminary population state is then subjected to random mutations of the fol-
lowing form: in each population i, each member has probability εµi of discarding her
strategy and randomly selecting another from the strategy space Si, with each strategy
(including the one she just discarded) equally likely.6 This mutation process is carried
out independently across the members of a population, and similarly across populations,
resulting in the final population state for period t+ 1, pt+1.
5It might be objected that changing one’s strategy at an unreached decision node would not alter one’s
payoff, so that imitative strategy changes of this sort would not be expected, but this objection fails to take
into account the fundamental stochasticity of the process: even detrimental strategy changes are expected
to occur with some positive probability.
6We can easily allow for the possibility that not all mutations between strategies within a population
are equally likely; this case is discussed in Section 5.
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The evolutionary process with mutations can be summarized by the following scheme:
pt → selection (stochastic) → mutation (stochastic) → pt+1.
Within each population i, this is a stochastic process governed by the transition prob-
abilities T εi (pi, p
′
i|p−i). These individual population processes aggregate to an overall
Markov process over the state space P, defined by the transition probabilities T ε(p, p′) =∏I
i=1 T
ε
i (pi, p
′
i|p−i) (because the independence of the within-population processes is not
compromised by the mutations process we have defined).
Since µi > 0 for each population i, there is positive probability that, from any given
population state, any state can be reached in one generation (it just requires the appropri-
ate mutations). Consequently, the evolutionary process T ε(p, p′) with positive mutation
rates µi is an ergodic Markov chain. It therefore has a unique stationary distribution,
which it approaches in the long run.
In principle, this stationary distribution is analytically calculatable, but in reality,
for many games of interest, the state space (all possible population states) will usually
be so large that this calculation is infeasible. In general, the size of the state space is
|P| = ∏Ii=1 (Ni+|Si|−1|Si|−1 ). In the case of just two populations, each of size 20 members, and
each with 4 strategies available to its members, the size of the state space is approximately
3 × 106: calculating the stationary distribution thus involves solving a system of about
3× 106 linear equations. This problem intensifies as the population sizes increase.
In the next section, we employ a theorem of Fudenberg and Imhof [1] to show that,
when the mutation rate is very small for each population (ε  1), the stationary dis-
tribution of the evolutionary process with mutations approximates an embedded Markov
process on a much-reduced state space, the set of all pure states Ppure (the size of which
does not increase with increasing population size). Moreover, the asymmetry of the un-
derlying game will render selection frequency-independent in the rare-mutations regime.
This will make calculation of the transition probabilities of this embedded Markov chain
much simpler than for symmetric games.
3 The stationary distribution when mutations are rare
Assumptions 1 and 2, which concern the within-population no-mutation evolutionary pro-
cesses T 0i , translate into the following two straightforward propositions, stated without
proof, concerning the aggregate no-mutation process T 0:
Proposition 1. Under T 0, all pure population states p ∈ Ppure are absorbing.
Proposition 2. Under T 0, all population states p ∈ P\Ppure are transient.
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Label pure population states by s = 〈s1, . . . , sI〉 ∈ Ppure: here, all members of popula-
tion i play strategy si ∈ Si. Denote by s/s′i the population state where every population
j 6= i is monomorphic for the strategy sj , and population i is monomorphic for the strat-
egy si except for one individual, who plays s
′
i 6= si. Let the set of all such states be Ppure/i.
Proposition 3. Fix s ∈ Ppure, and consider the limit lim
ε→0
T ε(s, p)
ε for states p ∈ P\{s}. This
limit exists for all states p ∈ P\{s}. However, lim
ε→0
T ε(s, p)
ε > 0 if, and only if, p ∈ Ppure/i
for some i. Otherwise, lim
ε→0
T ε(s, p)
ε = 0.
To prove this, note that T ε(s, p) is a polynomial in ε for all p. For T ε(s, s/s′i), this
polynomial has lowest-order term Niµi|Si| ε, and so limε→0
T ε(s, s/s′i)
ε =
Niµi
|Si| > 0. On the other
hand, if the states s and p differ by the strategy played by more than one individual, then
a one-step transition from the former to the latter requires more than one mutation, so
T ε(s, p) has lowest-order term of order εk, k ≥ 2. Thus, for such states p, lim
ε→0
T ε(s, p)
ε = 0.
Proposition 3 states that mutations from a pure state to a state where only one indi-
vidual in one of the populations deviates from the pure state are, for small mutation rates,
at least an order of magnitude more likely than other transitions from the pure state (and,
owing to the pure states being absorbing under the no-mutation process, mutations are
the only way to transition out of pure states).
Now suppose that, from a pure state s, the system transitions to the state s/s′i. Since
interior states in population i are transient, absent further mutations in population i,
the process will absorb either back into the pure state s (the mutant strategy s′i has
‘gone extinct’) or into the pure state 〈s′i, s−i〉 = 〈s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sI〉 (the mutant
strategy s′i has ‘fixed’).
But when the mutation rates are very small, we should expect this extinction or fixation
of strategy s′i to occur before another mutant appears in population i, and indeed before
a mutant subsequently appears in any other population. This latter fact, that no mutant
is expected to appear in any of the other populations during the extinction/fixation event
in population i, is key in determining the probability that fixation of s′i will occur in
population i. Because the underlying payoffs to, and thus fitnesses of, strategies si (the
‘incumbent’ strategy) and s′i (the ‘mutant’ strategy) depend only on the population states
in the other populations, and since these are fixed at s−i for the duration of the extinction
or fixation of s′i, the fitness difference between si and s
′
i is constant for the duration of
this event. Thus, selection is frequency-independent in this regime, a fact that will make
the calculation of the various fixation probabilities significantly simpler.
To formalize this intuition, for states s ∈ Ppure and s/s′i ∈ Ppure/i define µˆi(si, s′i) :=
lim
ε→0
T ε(s, s/s′i)
ε =
Niµi
|Si| = µˆi, and let ρi(si, s
′
i|s−i) be the ‘fixation probability’ that, given
that populations −i remain monomorphic for strategies s−i, a s′i mutant who appears in
population i that is otherwise monomorphic for strategy si subsequently fixes. Assumption
8
2 ensures that this probability is always positive.
Now let K = |Ppure| = ∏Ii=1 |Si|, and let 1, . . . ,K be some enumeration of the pure
population states.7 Construct a K ×K transition probability matrix Λ as follows:
• If the pure states labelled m and n are s = 〈si, s−i〉 and 〈s′i, s−i〉 respectively (i.e.,
pure states that differ by only one population’s strategy), then Λmn = µˆiρi(si, s
′
i|s−i).
• If the pure states m and n differ by more than one population’s strategy, Λmn = 0.
• Having thus defined Λmn for all distinct m and n, define Λmm = 1−
∑
n6=m Λmn.
Λ is the transition probability matrix for a homogeneous Markov chain over the (finite)
state space Ppure.8 Moreover, this Markov chain is irreducible, since any pure state can be
reached from any other with positive probability in a number of steps equal to the number
of populations on whose strategies the two pure states differ.
This establishes the final proposition that we require, that Λ induces a unique station-
ary distribution on the state space of pure population states [36]:
Proposition 4. There is a unique vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λK) such that λj ≥ 0 for all j,
λ1 + . . .+ λK = 1, and λΛ = λ.
We are now in a position to state our main result. Propositions 1-4 ensure that T 0,
T ε, and Λ satisfy Assumptions 6-9 of Fudenberg and Imhof [1]. Employing their Theorem
2,9 we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For each ε, denote by λε the unique stationary distribution of the Markov
process T ε. If n corresponds, in the enumeration of pure states, to the pure state s, then
lim
ε→0
λε(s) = λn.
That is, the stationary distributions of T ε approach λ as mutation rates become small.
4 The usefulness of the result
Our result is useful on two fronts. First, it extends to asymmetric games our ability to
compute the limiting stationary distributions of finite-population evolutionary or imitation
7A particular enumeration that we have found useful: writing Ki =
∏I
j=i+1 |Si|, enumerate the pure
state 〈sm11 , . . . , smII 〉 by
∑I−1
i=1 Ki(mi− 1) +mI . The population states in the pure state enumerated n can
then be recovered as follows: mI − 1 = n mod |SI |, and mi − 1 =
⌊
n
Ki
⌋
mod |Si| for each i < I.
8If there are some m such that Λmm < 0 in the above construction of Λ, one can rescale all mutation
rates µi by an appropriately small factor to render all Λmm > 0. Any such rescaling will result in the same
stationary distribution induced by Λ.
9A simple proof of a generalization of Fudenberg and Imhof’s [1] result, holding for more general
evolutionary processes, has recently been given by McAvoy [37].
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processes. We have argued that it is these games, and asymmetric multi-stage games in
particular, for which stochastic finite-population dynamics are most relevant.
Second, the fixation probabilities used to calculate Λ derive from frequency-independent
selection. Since frequency-independent selection has long been a standard assumption of
the population genetics literature, we can make use of the many results about fixation prob-
abilities in that literature. This bridge between evolutionary game theory and classical
population genetics could allow for analytical calculation of the rare-mutations stationary
distribution, where this would be impossible or infeasible in a single-population symmetric
game setup [1] (where the fixation probabilities that compose Λ derive from frequency-
dependent selection, and therefore typically do not exist in closed form, or are intractable
when they do [7]10)
To illustrate this, we consider three examples: a ‘battle of the sexes’ game, a discrete
Crawford-Sobel signalling game [15], and the ‘beer-quiche’ game of Cho and Kreps [2].
Example 1: Battle of the sexes
The well-known ‘battle of the sexes’ game involves a man and a woman hoping to coordi-
nate their weekend activities, which are either going to a ballet performance (the woman’s
preference) or going to a rugby match (the man’s preference). Both the man and the
woman prefer coordination on either activity to not coordinating. The simple example we
shall study is summarized by the payoff matrix:
Man
B
R
Woman
B R
1, 2 0, 0
0, 0 2, 1
To cast this into an evolutionary model, assume two separate populations of men and
women, of size Nm and Nw respectively. Each period, each member of each population goes
either to the ballet or to the rugby, and receives his/her expected payoff from interacting
with a random member of the other population. (This corresponds to members of each
group preferring to be at an event attended by many members of the other group, though
males would prefer this to be at the rugby, and females would prefer it to be at the
ballet—not too unworldly a scenario!)
10In the particular case where the evolutionary process is a birth-death process [7, 36], a closed form
for fixation probabilities exists—see, e.g., [36, Sec. 4.7] and [7, Eq. 6.13]. In general, it is a complicated
expression involving the relative fitnesses of the incumbent and mutant strategies at each possible inter-
mediate frequency of the mutant strategy. One case for which this expression simplifies to a tractable
form is the Moran process, if fitnesses are calculated as exponential functions of game payoffs [38, 39]. For
some other frequency-dependent evolutionary processes, fixation probabilities can be shown to approach
tractable representations as the population size becomes very large—see, e.g., [40]. However, as we shall
discuss in Section 5, the cases to which the ‘rare mutations’ approximation studied here best applies are
specifically those where population sizes are not too large.
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Expected payoffs Epi within both populations translate to fitnesses via the linear trans-
formation fθ(Epi) = 1 + ηθEpi, where θ is either m (‘man’) or w (‘woman’), and ηm and
ηw are the strengths of selection in the men’s and women’s populations respectively. The
evolutionary or imitation dynamics within each population are assumed to be a Moran
process [7, 30], occurring with mutations in the manner set out in Section 2. The per-
person mutation, or experimentation/error, rates in the men’s and women’s populations
are εµm and εµw respectively.
In populating the rare-mutations Markov matrix Λ, we need only consider transitions
between pure states where either the male population’s strategy is different or the female
population’s strategy is different, but not both. For example, consider the transition from
the pure state where the men all go to the rugby and the women all to the ballet, (R,B),
to the pure state where everyone goes to the rugby, (R,R). (The bold font indicates that
these are population strategies.) In the former ‘incumbent’ female population, members
all had fitness 1 + ηw(0) = 1. A mutant woman going instead to the rugby has fitness
1 + ηw(1) = 1 + ηw, and thus has (frequency-independent) selective advantage ηw over the
ballet-going members of the female population.
This frequency independence allows us to make use of the well-known formula for
fixation probability under a Moran process [7]: If a single mutant has selective advantage
s over the other members of the (size N) population, then its fixation probability is
ρ(s) =
1− 1/(1 + s)
1− 1/(1 + s)N
for s 6= 0, and ρ(0) = 1/N . The corresponding formula for the case of frequency-dependent
selection is significantly more complicated [7, 36].
The entry of Λ corresponding to the transition (R,B)→ (R,R) is therefore
Λ(R,B)→(R,R) = µˆwρw(ηw) =
Nwµw
2
1− 1/(1 + ηw)
1− 1/(1 + ηw)Nw .
For the reverse transition (R,R) → (R,B), mutant women have fitness 1, while
incumbents have fitness 1 + ηw. Mutants are thus at relative selective disadvantage
(1)−(1+ηw)
1+ηw
= −ηw/(1 + ηw), and the relevant entry of Λ is
Λ(R,R)→(R,B) = µˆwρw
( −ηw
1 + ηw
)
=
Nwµw
2
1− (1 + ηw)
1− (1 + ηw)Nw .
The other entries of Λ are calculated similarly. Enumerating the pure states (B,B),
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(B,R), (R,B), and (R,R) as 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively,
Λ =

1− . . . µˆwρw( −2ηw1+2ηw ) µˆmρm(
−ηm
1+ηm
) 0
µˆwρw(2ηw) 1− . . . 0 µˆmρm(2ηm)
µˆmρm(ηm) 0 1− . . . µˆwρw(ηw)
0 µˆmρm(
−2ηm
1+2ηm
) µˆwρw(
−ηw
1+ηw
) 1− . . .
 ,
where the ellipses abbreviate that the rows must each sum to one.
We have a number of free parameters in this model; to wit: the sizes of, selection
strengths in, and mutation rates in the two populations. As an example, suppose we set
the sizes of, and selection strengths in, the two populations equal at N and η respectively.
Making use of the fact that, for the Moran process, ρ(s)/ρ(−s/[1 + s]) = (1 + s)N−1, we
calculate the stationary distribution of the Markov chain defined by Λ:
λ =
[
1,
1
(1 + 2η)N−1
,
1
(1 + η)N−1
, 1
]
/λ¯,
where λ¯ is a normalization constant. Notice that, in the rare mutations limit, the muta-
tion rates, though possibly different in the two populations, do not affect the long-term
distribution of states.
The proportions of time the populations spend both at the rugby and both at the
ballet are equal, and are higher for larger values of the common selection strength η
and population size N . The intuition for this effect of η is straightforward: A higher
η increases the fixation probabilities of positively selected mutants, and decreases the
fixation probabilities of negatively selected mutants. In this coordination game, the former
are always mutants leading towards the coordination equilibria (B,B) and (R,R), while
the latter are always mutants leading away from these coordination equilibria.
The effect of population size can most easily be seen from the ratio of transition
probabilities from a non-coordination to a coordination state (positive selection s) and
vice-versa (negative selection −s/[1 + s]): ρ(s)/ρ(−s/[1 + s]) = (1 + s)N−1. This ratio
increases with N , and so, for each path into and out of a coordination equilibrium, a
higher N increases the transition probability into, relative to the symmetric probability
out.
Example 2: Crawford-Sobel signalling
The next game to which we apply our result is a discrete variant of a signalling game from
Crawford and Sobel [15, Sec. 4]. Suppose that there are three possible states of the world,
θ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, with each equally likely. A signaller observes the state of the world, and
sends a costless signal s ∈ {a, b, c} to a receiver, who observes only the signal, and not the
state of the world. Having observed the signal, the receiver makes a decision r. Payoffs to
12
signaller and receiver are as follows:
piS(θ, r) = −(r − θ − γ)2,
piR(θ, r) = −(r − θ)2,
where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter that characterizes the signaller and receiver’s misalignment of
interests (for every θ, the receiver’s optimal decision is γ lower than the signaller would
most want it to be). For simplicity, we restrict the receiver’s possible decisions r to the
set {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, which covers all possible optimal decisions the receiver could make
given some posterior over the state space, having observed a signal.
For all γ ≥ 0, Nash equilibria exist where the signaller sends the same signal no
matter the state of the world, and the receiver, observing that signal, makes decision
r = 1. We call these equilibria ‘uninformative’, and label them ‘xxx’, since the same
signal x ∈ {a, b, c} is sent for each state of the world {0, 1, 2}. Also, for all γ, Nash
equilibria exist where the signaller sends the same signal for states θ = 0 and θ = 2, and
a different signal for state θ = 1: to all sent signals, the receiver responds with decision 1.
Since no practical (decision-changing) information is transmitted by the signaller, we also
call these equilibria, labelled ‘xyx’, ‘uninformative’.
For sufficiently low γ, there also exist ‘partially informative’ equilibria where, for two
adjacent states of the world (i.e., {0,1} or {1,2}), the signaller sends the same signal,
but for the other state of the world, sends a different signal. For such ‘xxy’ and ‘xyy’
equilibria, these threshold values for γ are 0.25 and 0.75 respectively.
Finally, for γ ≤ 0.5, there exist ‘informative’ equilibria, where the signaller sends a
different signal for each state (‘xyz’), and the receiver makes a decision equal to the state
that the signal is sent from.
A full characterization of the Nash equilibria of this game, including the receiver’s
responses to unsent signals required to sustain each equilibrium, is included in an appendix.
Crawford and Sobel [15] argue, somewhat informally, that for a given value of γ, the
most reasonable equilibria are the most informative ones possible for that γ. This, they
claim, is because these equilibria are Pareto-superior to less informative equilibria, and
are salient—or ‘focal’ in Schelling’s [24] language—in that they are the most informative
equilibria (the other salient equilibria are the least informative ones, but these are ruled
out on the former grounds of being Pareto-inferior to the most informative equilibria).
The methodology developed in the present paper allows us to test this equilibrium
selection prediction more formally, in the context of learning by agents. Notice that
none of the equilibria that are not perfectly informative is strict, so that a deterministic
infinite-population approach would be of little use here, particularly for higher values of
the misalignment parameter γ (for which the informative equilibria do not exist). Instead,
our finite-population approach is better-suited to this game.
We assume two populations, one of signallers and one of receivers. The size of each
population is N . Each signaller is equipped with a response to each possible state of the
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world, and each receiver with a response to each possible signal. States of the world are
drawn independently for each individual interaction (i.e., there is no aggregate state of
the world), and fitnesses are calculated according to expected payoffs.
Evolution within each population is assumed to be a Wright-Fisher process [31, 32],
which has been used as a model for both biological evolution [41] as well as imitation
learning [42, 43]. Expected payoffs translate to fitnesses exponentially, f(Epi) = exp(ηEpi),
with selection strength η and per-person mutation rate εµ in both populations.
In constructing Λ, frequency-independent selection allows us to make use of the well-
known ‘diffusion approximation’ formula for the fixation probability, under the Wright-
Fisher process, of a single mutant at selective advantage s in a population of size N [44]:
ρ(s) ≈ 1− exp (−s)
1− exp (−Ns)
for s 6= 0, and ρ(0) = 1/N .11 Again, the case of frequency-dependent selection is signifi-
cantly more complicated [47–49].
We use these fixation probabilities to populate Λ according to the method set out in
Section 3, and calculate its stationary distribution. Fig. 1 plots, for the case N = 100 and
η = 1, and for various values of the misalignment parameter γ, the relative frequencies of
equilibria of different information levels in this stationary distribution.12
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that the results of the learning/evolutionary dynamics in this
game broadly support Crawford and Sobel’s prediction that the most informative equilibria
supportable by a given γ are the most reasonable for that γ. For low levels of misalignment
γ < 0.4, the informative equilibria dominate, and information transmission is almost
always perfect in the long run. For intermediate levels of misalignment (0.4 < γ < 1),
partially informative equilibria, especially those of the form xyy, are dominant. For high
levels of misalignment (γ > 1), only uninformative equilibria can be supported, and indeed
such equilibria dominate the long-run dynamics.
Note that the equilibria involving signalling of the forms xxy and xyx do not have
analogs in the equilibria of the game with continuous state, signal, and decision spaces
[15]; they are artefacts of the discrete structure of the game we have set up. It is reassuring,
then, that they play little role in the long-run dynamics for all values of γ.
11The diffusion approximation formula cited above is known to be very accurate [45, 46], and we would
expect our results to alter very little were we to use near-exact numerical approximations of the true fixation
probabilities. Such numerical estimation of fixation probabilities is computationally very expensive, which
further highlights the value of our result: when selection is frequency dependent, as in the single-population
symmetric-game case, fixation probabilities will usually have to be estimated numerically, whereas in our
asymmetric-game case, where selection is frequency independent, we may make use of well-known exact
or approximate closed-form fixation probabilities.
12The frequencies that we plot for a given equilibrium type are in fact those of all population states
whose signalling profile is consistent with that equilibrium type: because the populations are large and
selection is strong, the plotted frequencies correspond closely with those of the equilibria (which would
take into account receiver behaviour too).
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Figure 1: Frequencies of the signalling profiles of different levels of information transmis-
sion in the long-run dynamics of the Crawford-Sobel game, plotted for various values of the
misalignment parameter γ. Both signaller and receiver populations are of size N = 100;
fitness is exponential in expected payoffs, with equal selection strength η = 1; mutation
rates are equal in the two populations. The results are broadly consistent with Crawford
and Sobel’s prediction that the most informative equilibria supportable by a given value
of γ are the most reasonable for that γ.
Example 3: The beer-quiche game
Our final example is the beer-quiche game of Cho and Kreps [2], employed by them to
illustrate the equilibrium refinement method they advance, the ‘Intuitive Criterion’. The
extensive form of the game is given in Fig. 2. Player 1 is either a wimp (type tw) or surly
(type ts), with probabilities 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. Player 1 knows his type; player 2
does not. Player 1 either has beer or quiche for breakfast, observed by player 2, who then
chooses whether to fight player 1 or not. The payoffs are such that player 2 should choose
to fight player 1 if the posterior probability he holds that player 1 is a wimp is greater
than 0.5. For any action by player 2, player 1 prefers beer for breakfast if he is surly, but
quiche if he is a wimp. Regardless of player 1’s type, he would prefer to avoid fighting.
The game has two Bayesian Nash equilibria, both of the ‘pooling’ kind: one in which
player 1 eats quiche no matter his type, and one in which player 1 drinks beer no mat-
ter his type. In both cases, player 2 chooses not to fight in response to the observed
behaviour of player 1, but would fight in response to the unobserved behaviour. Both
pooling equilibria are sustained by player 2’s ‘out-of-equilibrium’ belief that, if he were
to observe player 1 having the opposite breakfast to that consumed in equilibrium, there
would be a greater-than-half chance that player 1’s type was wimp. Cho and Kreps’s Intu-
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Figure 2: Extensive form setup of the beer-quiche game of Cho and Kreps [2].
itive Criterion, however, rules out the always-quiche equilibrium, by the argument that the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that player 2 is required to hold do not survive forward-inductive
reasoning [2] [50, Ch. 11.2].
The Intuitive Criterion has been criticized as being, in some cases, too rationality-
heavy [50]. Our methodology allows us to test whether its prediction in the beer-quiche
game holds up under a rationality-light learning process, where players need not even
know the other players’ payoffs.
We assume two populations, one for each role. Evolution proceeds in each population
as a Wright-Fisher process with mutations. The population of player i’s, ‘population
i’, is of size Ni, with selection strength ηi, exponential fitness fi = exp(ηiEpi), and per-
individual mutation rate µi. Each member of population 1 has a strategy prescribing his
breakfast choice (beer or quiche) if he turns out to be wimpish (with probability 0.1) and
if he turns out to be surly (with probability 0.9). Each member of population 2 has a
strategy prescribing his response (fight or don’t fight) to seeing a member of population 1
drink beer for breakfast, and to seeing a member of population 1 eat quiche. Each round,
each member of each population receives his expected ex-ante (i.e., before types are chosen
in population 1) payoff from interacting with a random member of the other population.
We label pure population states by the tuple b(tw), b(ts); r(B), r(Q): respectively,
breakfast had when wimpish, breakfast had when surly; response to beer-drinking, re-
sponse to quiche-eating. For the former two, B and Q represent ‘beer’ and ‘quiche’, while,
for the latter two, F and N represent ‘fight’ and ‘no fight’. Again, the bold font is used
to indicate that these are population strategies.
The weights of the most popular states in the stationary distribution are displayed in
Fig. 3, for the parameter settings η1 = η2 = 0.2, µ1 = µ2, and for various population sizes
N = N1 = N2. For large population sizes (N > 20), the pooling equilibrium predicted
by the Intuitive Criterion, BB;NF, is the modal state in the stationary distribution.
For all population sizes, the other pooling equilibrium, ‘all-quiche’, has low weight in the
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Figure 3: The frequencies of various population states in the long run dynamics of the
beer-quiche game, plotted for various common population sizes N = N1 = N2. For
reference, population state ‘QB;NF’ is that where members of population 1 eat quiche
(Q) if wimpish and drink beer (B) if surly, while members of population 2 do not fight
(N) if they see beer-drinking and do fight (F) if they see quiche-eating. The equilibrium
predicted by the Intuitive Criterion, BB;NF, is modal for large (> 20), but not for low
(< 20), population sizes. The equilibrium ruled out by the Intuitive Criterion, QQ;FN,
is infrequent in the long-run dynamics for all population sizes.
stationary distribution; this supports its rejection by the Intuitive Criterion.
Apart from the fact that, of the two Bayesian Nash equilibria, the one predicted by
the Intuitive Criterion is dominant, it is also of interest that non-equilibrium population
states occur so frequently in the long run. These states are, in order of their weights in the
stationary distribution, QB;NF, QB;NN, and BB;NN. Indeed, for small population
sizes (N < 20), the state QB;NF has highest weight in the stationary distribution.
The success of these non-equilibrium states is a result of neutral and nearly-neutral
drift. Starting from the equilibrium state BB;NF, members of population 2 who instead
play NN achieve the same expected payoff (0.9) as those playing NF , and so can neutrally
invade the population. If they fix, the pure population state BB;NN is established. From
this state, members of population 1 who play QB are slightly favoured over the incumbents
playing BB (expected payoff 3 versus 2.9), and so can invade and fix, establishing the
pure state QB;NN. From this state, members of population 2 who play NF are slightly
favoured (expected payoff 1 versus incumbent expected payoff 0.9). If they invade and
fix, pure state QB;NF is established. But from this pure state, members of population
1 who play BB are slightly favoured (expected payoff 2.9 versus incumbent 2.8). If they
invade and fix, the equilibrium pure state BB;NF is re-established. Notice that, because
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the reverse directions involve only neutral and slightly disfavourable mutations, they also
occur with non-negligible probability, and are therefore likely to influence the stationary
distribution.
The intuition for the fact that increased population size here results in the system
spending more time in the Nash equilibrium state is similar to that for the same observation
in the battle of the sexes. When the population size is small, mutants that are weakly
selected against still have non-negligible probability of fixing, and so transitions out of
BB;NF to, say, QB;NF (mutant’s expected payoff only 0.1 less than incumbents’) play
a role in the long-run dynamics. When the population size is very large, mutants that
are weakly selected against have very little chance of fixing, and so these paths out of
equilibrium are shut down, leaving only neutral paths such as BB;NF → BB;NN.
Increasing selection strength η would have the same effect.
5 Discussion
Our model involves a number of assumptions and simplifications, four major ones of which
we discuss below: (i) the assumption of multiple populations, (ii) that, in the no-mutations
process, only pure states are absorbing, (iii) that mutations can, in reality, be sufficiently
rare for the evolutionary dynamics to behave like the limiting case, and (iv) that mutation
rates within populations are uniform. Thereafter, we briefly discuss the relevance of the
approach developed in this paper for mixed-strategy equilibria.
On (i), an alternative approach would be to model evolution as occurring in a single
population, wherein each agent has a strategy for every role [51]. Expected payoffs to
players could then be computed on the basis of random assignment of roles each period.
In most learning contexts, the multiple-population setup seems more natural: we think
of roles as being assigned at the outset, with each agent subsequently learning how best
to play her assigned role. An example is the battle of the sexes game studied in Section
4, where the gender of each agent is fixed for the duration of his/her learning period.
The multiple-population setup is also better suited to modelling the genetical evolution of
multiple interacting, though reproductively distinct, species. In the context of genetical
evolution within a single species, however, the more natural model is a single population
in whose genomes strategies for different roles are encoded at different loci. Strategies are
then collections of alleles, one for each locus, and are inherited intact (ignoring genetic
recombination). In the course of the propagation of a strategy, which locus is relevant will
change from generation to generation, as different roles are taken on (carrier is male or
female, carrier is the incumbent occupant of a territory or the trespasser, etc.).
When should we expect the evolutionary dynamics under this single-population model
to resemble those under our multiple-population model (where each locus, or role, is
treated as a separate ‘population’)? Here, the answer is simpler for deterministic infinite-
population dynamics. If there is variation within the population for alleles (/strategies)
at multiple loci (multiple loci exhibit ‘polymorphism’), then the multiple-population ap-
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proach and the single-population approach yield equivalent dynamics under the determin-
istic replicator dynamics if a simple condition concerning allele frequencies holds [52]. This
condition, known in the population genetics literature as linkage equilibrium, amounts to
statistical independence of allele frequencies across loci, and is preserved through time
under the replicator dynamics [52].
In a finite population, polymorphism at multiple loci will be common if the mutation
rate or the population size are sufficiently large. The stochastic nature of the evolutionary
process in a finite population ensures that linkage equilibrium will not always hold, and so
a ‘dynamical equivalence’ result such as that described above is not possible. Nonetheless,
if mutations at different loci occur independently, then in the regime of rare mutations
studied in this paper, it will almost always be the case that at most one locus is polymor-
phic in the population. Thus linkage equilibrium will almost always hold, since linkage
disequilibrium between two loci requires that both loci be polymorphic. In the rare muta-
tions limit, therefore, the dynamics are the same whether we model evolution as occurring
in multiple populations of loci, or in a single multi-locus population.
On (ii), we noted that, in multi-stage games, play at unreached decision nodes could
not be imitated if imitation were a learning process based only on direct observation of
play. Under this condition, interpreting assumption 2 as applying to imitation processes
seems unjustified—mixed population states in which one population is polymorphic for
an action at an unreached decision node could be maintained in perpetuity. As argued
in Section 2, this condition represents an unrealistic ‘knife-edge’ case. In reality, we ex-
pect agents to communicate about their strategies. The case of imitation only by direct
observation is nonetheless a useful benchmark from which to discuss the influence of the
general factors that validate assumption 2 for imitation learning processes. Despite the
obvious importance of such a discussion, it has not, to our knowledge, explicitly appeared
in the literature on stochastic learning in extensive form games.
On (iii), how rare do mutations have to be for the population dynamics to resemble
those in our limiting case? A simple heuristic may be derived as follows: Assume all I
populations to be of size N , with a common individual mutation rate of µ. Consider the
case where, starting from a monomorphic state, a mutant appears in one of the populations.
Under most commonly studied population dynamics (e.g., Wright-Fisher, Moran), the time
that it takes this mutant either to go extinct or fix in its population is of order N or less
[23, 53]. Say that this time is aN . Then the probability that another mutant appears
during the extinction/fixation of this mutant is about µNI × aN ; for this probability to
be below some small threshold ν, we require µ < ν/(aIN2). If this holds, the dynamics
should resemble those for the limiting case µ→ 0.
The bound could probably be loosened for most games, as it can be in the single-
population symmetric game case (Wu et al. [54]): the analogous loosening of the bound
in Wu et al. [54] is from order 1/N2 (our heuristic) to order 1/(N lnN). In their case,
this holds for all games except coexistence games, in which mixed equilibria are stable.
The reason for this latter fact is that, if selection is very strong in a coexistence game,
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the population can stabilize around the mixed equilibrium for a very long period of time,
long enough for another mutation to occur with non-negligible probability. In the case of
coexistence games, the bound must be tightened to order N−1/2e−N [54]. In asymmetric
games, an analogous ‘negative feedback’ issue could arise in a situation where two popula-
tions stabilize each other at respective mixed equilibria. A good example is the ‘matching
pennies’ game, where the row player and column player have the same strategy space
(heads and tails); if the strategies played match, the row player gets payoff +1 and the
column player gets −1, and if they don’t match, the row player gets −1 and the column
player +1. In our multi-population context, if the column population predominantly plays
heads, the row population moves to predominantly playing heads, which in turn leads to
a decrease in the play of heads in the column population, and a subsequent decrease in
the play of heads in the row population, etc. If selection is strong enough, this situa-
tion could persist for long enough that the chance of another mutation occurring would
be non-negligible. (Recent derivations [55] of fixation probabilities in a Moran process
when multiple populations are polymorphic should be useful in analyzing such cases.) In
this case, a strengthening of the ‘rare mutation’ bound would be required: following the
analysis of Wu et al. [54], we would expect a bound of order I−1N−1/2e−N to suffice.
In any case, it is clear that our rare-mutations result is most relevant either if mutations
(or experimentation and errors) occur at a low per-period rate, or if the populations under
study are small, or both. In learning dynamics, interpretation of this ‘rare mutations’
condition is difficult, since the rate of mutations is calibrated to the timescale over which
strategy revisions are made. Thus, a ‘generation’ might in fact constitute a very short
period of time, and we might expect experimentation or errors to be very infrequent on
such a timescale. Interpretation of this condition is easier for genetical evolution, where
the timescale is in generations, and the probabilities of mutations can be reasonably well
measured. For example, the point mutation rate at a single nucleotide site in humans
(though known to vary across the genome [56–58], and between the sexes [59]) is of order
about 10−8 per generation [60, 61]. If we set a threshold of ν = 0.05 and a = 1, and
consider evolution at two independent loci (‘roles’), then the bound µ < ν/(aIN2) holds
for populations of up to about 1500 individuals.
On (iv), it may be objected that, in our model, mutation rates within populations are
uniform: a mutation from any strategy to any other strategy is equally likely. While this
assumption may be valid in certain genetic contexts, in a learning context we might expect
certain errors, or examples of experimentation, to be less likely than others [9]. Also, in
a genetical context, if we include in our concept of mutation the possibility of structural
changes (e.g., rearrangements, translocations), or if we are interested in the evolutionary
dynamics of a certain functional genotype relative to all other genotypes (grouped as one
class), then asymmetric mutation rates would be natural [62, 63].
Our result can be generalized in a straightforward way to incorporate heterogeneity
in mutation rates within populations. If we denote by εµi(si, s
′
i) the probability that a
member of preliminary period-t population i currently employing strategy si will mutate
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to playing s′i in the finalized period-t population, then the evolutionary process with
mutations is a Markov chain T ε. It is still the case that, for s = 〈s1, . . . , sI〉 ∈ Ppure,
lim
ε→0
T ε(s,p)
ε = 0 if p /∈ Ppure∪Ppure/i for some i. But now, for s/s′i ∈ Ppure/i, limε→0
T ε(s,s/s′i)
ε =
Niµi(si, s
′
i). The transition probability matrix Λ is then constructed as before.
If it is always the case that µi(si, s
′
i) > 0, then the Markov chain defined by Λ is
irreducible, and an analogous form of Theorem 1 goes through as before. If, however, we
allow there to be some i, si, and s
′
i such that µi(si, s
′
i) = 0, then the T
ε are no longer
guaranteed to induce irreducible Markov chains. It is then required that T ε have a unique
stationary distribution for each ε > 0, and that there exists a unique stochastic vector λ
such that λΛ = λ, for the analogous Theorem 2 to go through [1, 37].
A final point concerns games with mixed-strategy equilibria. In evolutionary game
theory, two kinds of ‘mixed strategy’ states must be distinguished [64, 65]. The ‘popula-
tion kind’ is where individuals within a population each play pure strategies, but different
individuals play different strategies. In our setup, when mutations are rare, the system
spends almost all of the long-run time in pure states (where individuals within each pop-
ulation all play the same strategy); mixed strategies of the ‘population kind’ are therefore
essentially never observed. The underlying reason is that these polymorphic states are
transient under the no-mutations process. For a different reason, these ‘population kind’
mixed states are also excluded by the evolutionary stability concept of infinite-population
deterministic dynamics in asymmetric games: the component strategies of an equilibrium
mixed state must have equal fitness, but then any of them could be involved in a ‘neutral
invasion’ of the state [66].
The second kind of mixed strategy state is the ‘individual kind’, and involves the
individuals of a population all playing the same mixed strategy. Unlike the ‘population
kind’, such states can be evolutionarily stable in infinite-population dynamics. They
do, however, raise a problem for our finite-population approach. Allowing individuals to
play any mixed strategy requires an infinite strategy space (the unit simplex in R|Si|, for
population i with pure-strategy space Si), and therefore an infinitely large state space. A
workaround would be to approximate the infinite strategy space R|Si| by a discrete lattice.
References
[1] Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Imitation processes with small mutations. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory. 2006;131(1):251–262.
[2] Cho IK, Kreps DM. Signaling games and stable equilibria. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 1987;102(2):179–221.
[3] Maynard Smith J. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press;
1982.
[4] Weibull JW. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT press; 1997.
21
[5] Hofbauer J, Sigmund K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge
University Press; 1998.
[6] Samuelson L. Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection. MIT Press; 1998.
[7] Nowak MA. Evolutionary dynamics. Harvard University Press; 2006.
[8] Sandholm WH. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. MIT press; 2010.
[9] Fudenberg D, Levine DK. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press; 1998.
[10] Foster D, Young P. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population
Biology. 1990;38(2):219–232.
[11] Kandori M, Mailath GJ, Rob R. Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in
Games. Econometrica. 1993;61(1):29–56.
[12] Young HP. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica. 1993;61(1):57–84.
[13] McAvoy A. Stochastic selection processes. arXiv preprint arXiv:151105390. 2015;.
[14] Spence AM. Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1973;87(3):355–374.
[15] Crawford VP, Sobel J. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica.
1982;50(6):1431–1451.
[16] Grafen A. Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology.
1990;144(4):517–546.
[17] Salop SC. Strategic Entry Deterrence. American Economic Review. 1979;69(2):335–
38.
[18] Milgrom P, Roberts J. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. Journal of
Economic Theory. 1982;27(2):280–312.
[19] Maynard Smith J, Parker GA. The logic of asymmetric contests. Animal behaviour.
1976;24(1):159–175.
[20] Kydland FE, Prescott EC. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Op-
timal Plans. The Journal of Political Economy. 1977;85(3):473–492.
[21] Samuelson L, Zhang J. Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games. Journal of
Economic Theory. 1992;57(2):363–391.
[22] Crow JF, Kimura M. An Introduction to Population Genetics Theory. Harper &
Row; 1970.
22
[23] Ewens WJ. Mathematical Population Genetics. I. Theoretical Introduction. Springer;
2004.
[24] Schelling TC. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press; 1960.
[25] Hofbauer J, Sigmund K. The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems: Mathe-
matical Aspects of Selection. Cambridge University Press; 1988.
[26] Hofbauer J. Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: a Hamiltonian system?
Journal of Mathematical Biology. 1996;34(5-6):675–688.
[27] Bergstrom CT, Lachmann M. The Red King effect: when the slowest runner
wins the coevolutionary race. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
2003;100(2):593–598.
[28] Fishman MA. Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs.
Games and Economic Behavior. 2008;63(1):77–90.
[29] Ohtsuki H. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games. Journal of Theo-
retical Biology. 2010;264(1):136–142.
[30] Moran PAP; Cambridge Univ Press. Random processes in genetics. Proceedings of
the Cambridge Philosophical Society. 1958;54(01):60–71.
[31] Fisher RA. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Clarendon Press; 1930.
[32] Wright S. Evolution in Mendelian populations. Genetics. 1931;16(2):97–159.
[33] Binmore K, Samuelson L. Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection. Journal
of Economic Theory. 1997;74(2):235–265.
[34] Sandholm WH. Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents. Journal
of Economic Theory. 2012;147(5):2056–2071.
[35] Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Word-of-mouth communication and social learning. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1995;110(1):93–125.
[36] Karlin S, Taylor HM. A First Course in Stochastic Processes. Academic Press; 1975.
[37] McAvoy A. Comment on “Imitation processes with small mutations” [J. Econ. Theory
131 (2006) 251–262]. Journal of Economic Theory. 2015;159:66–69.
[38] Traulsen A, Shoresh N, Nowak MA. Analytical results for individual and group
selection of any intensity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 2008;70(5):1410–1424.
[39] Cooney D, Veller C. Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process
with exponential fitness. arXiv preprint arXiv:150905757. 2015;.
23
[40] Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations. Journal
of Economic Theory. 2008;140(1):229–245.
[41] Hartl DL, Clark AG. Principles of Population Genetics. 4th ed. Sinauer; 2007.
[42] Traulsen A, Hauert C. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. In: Schuster HG,
editor. Review of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity. vol. 2. Wiley-VCH; 2009. p.
25–61.
[43] Tarnita CE, Antal T, Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA. Evolutionary dynamics in set structured
populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2009;106(21):8601–
8604.
[44] Kimura M. On the probability of fixation of mutant genes in a population. Genetics.
1962;47(6):713–719.
[45] Ewens WJ. Numerical results and diffusion approximations in a genetic process.
Biometrika. 1963;50(3 and 4):241–249.
[46] Ewens WJ. The pseudo-transient distribution and its uses in genetics. Journal of
Applied Probability. 1964;1(1):141–156.
[47] Lessard S. Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New
perspectives for ESS theory. Theoretical Population Biology. 2005;68(1):19–27.
[48] Imhof LA, Nowak MA. Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process.
Journal of Mathematical Biology. 2006;52(5):667–681.
[49] Altrock PM, Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Stochastic slowdown in evolutionary processes.
Physical Review E. 2010;82(1):011925.
[50] Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory. MIT Press; 1991.
[51] McAvoy A, Hauert C. Asymmetric evolutionary games. PLoS Computational Biology.
2015;11(8):e1004349.
[52] Cressman R. Evolutionary dynamics and extensive form games. MIT Press; 2003.
[53] Kimura M, Ohta T. The average number of generations until fixation of a mutant
gene in a finite population. Genetics. 1969;61(3):763.
[54] Wu B, Gokhale CS, Wang L, Traulsen A. How small are small mutation rates?
Journal of Mathematical Biology. 2012;64(5):803–827.
[55] Sekiguchi T, Ohtsuki H. Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in
finite populations. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2015;p. 1–19.
24
[56] Wolfe KH, Sharp PM, Li WH. Mutation rates differ among regions of the mammalian
genome. Nature. 1989;337(6204):283–285.
[57] Williams EJB, Hurst LD. The proteins of linked genes evolve at similar rates. Nature.
2000;407(6806):900–903.
[58] Smith NGC, Webster MT, Ellegren H. Deterministic mutation rate variation in the
human genome. Genome research. 2002;12(9):1350–1356.
[59] Hurst LD, Ellegren H. Sex biases in the mutation rate. Trends in Genetics.
1998;14(11):446–452.
[60] Roach J, Glusman G, Smit A, Huff C, Hubley R, Shannon P, et al. Analysis of
Genetic Inheritance in a Family Quartet by Whole-Genome Sequencing. Science.
2010;328(5978):636–639.
[61] Lipson M, Loh PR, Sankararaman S, Patterson N, Berger B, Reich D. Calibrating the
human mutation rate via ancestral recombination density in diploid genomes. PLoS
Genetics. 2015;11(11).
[62] Nowak MA. What is a quasispecies? Trends in Ecology & Evolution. 1992;7(4):118–
121.
[63] McCandlish DM, Stoltzfus A. Modeling evolution using the probability of fixation:
History and implications. The Quarterly Review of Biology. 2014;89(3):225–252.
[64] Grafen A. The hawk-dove game played between relatives. Animal Behaviour.
1979;27(3):905–907.
[65] Bergstrom CT, Godfrey-Smith P. On the evolution of behavioral heterogeneity in
individuals and populations. Biology and Philosophy. 1998;13(2):205–231.
[66] Selten R. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts.
Journal of Theoretical Biology. 1980;84(1):93–101.
25
Appendix table 1: Values of γ for which the signalling equilibria of different information transmission levels exist. Sender strategies are of the
form (s(0), s(1), s(2)), so that, for example, xyy represents the strategies abb, acc, baa, etc. For each horizontal grey bar, the triplet inside is
the receiver strategy (r(x), r(y), r(z)) that supports the Nash equilibrium the grey bar represents. The dark grey bar indicates strict Nash
equilibrium.
γ = 0 0 < γ < 0.25 γ = 0.25 0.25 < γ < 0.5 γ = 0.5 0.5 < γ < 0.75 γ = 0.75 0.75 < γ < 1 γ ≥ 1
xyz (0.0, 1.0, 2.0)
xxy (0.5, 2.0, 0.0)
(0.5, 2.0, 0.5)
(0.5, 2.0, 1.5)
(0.5, 2.0, 2.0)
xyx (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)
(1.0, 1.0, 0.0)
(1.0, 1.0, 0.5)
xyy (0.0, 1.5, 0.0)
(0.0, 1.5, 0.5)
(0.0, 1.5, 1.0)
(0.0, 1.5, 1.5)
xxx (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)
(1.0, 1.0, 0.0)
(1.0, 0.0, 1.0)
(1.0, 0.0, 0.0)
(1.0, 0.0, 0.5)
(1.0, 0.5, 0.5)
(1.0, 0.5, 0.0)
(1.0, 1.0, 0.5)
(1.0, 0.5, 1.0)
